Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics by Christensen, Ian et al.
     
Christensen: Financial Stability Department, Bank of Canada, 234 Wellington, Ottawa, ON  Canada K1A 0G9 
ichristenses@bankofcanada.ca 
Meh: Canadian Economic Analysis Department, Bank of Canada, 234 Wellington, Ottawa, ON Canada K1A 0G9 
cmeh@bankofcanada.ca 
Moran: CIRPÉE, Département d’économique, Université Laval, Québec, QC Canada G1V 0A6 
kmoran@ecn.ulaval.ca 
 
 
We thank Hyun Song Shin and seminar participants at the Central Bank of Turkey, the Bank of Spain, the Riksbank, the Bank of 
Finland, the Banque de France, the Macro Workshop of TSE, the BIS, the Board of Governors, the New York Federal Reserve, 
UQAM, the Université de Montréal, as well as the annual conferences of the Society for Computation Economics, the Society for 
Economic Dynamics and the Canadian Economics Association for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 11-40 
 
 
Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics 
 
 
 
Ian Christensen 
Césaire Meh 
Kevin Moran 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Décembre/December 2011 
Abstract:  
This paper assesses the merits of countercyclical bank balance sheet regulation for the 
stabilization of financial and economic cycles and examines its interaction with monetary 
policy. The framework used is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with 
banks and bank capital, in which bank capital solves an asymmetric information problem 
between banks and their creditors. In this economy, the lending decisions of individual 
banks affect the riskiness of the whole banking sector, though banks do not internalize 
this impact. Regulation, in the form of a constraint on bank leverage, can mitigate the 
impact of this externality by inducing banks to alter the intensity of their monitoring 
efforts. We find that countercyclical bank leverage regulation can have desirable 
stabilization properties, particularly when financial shocks are an important source of 
economic fluctuations. However, the appropriate contribution of countercyclical capital 
requirements to stabilization after a technology shock depends on the size of the 
externality and on the conduct of the monetary authority. 
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1 Introduction
The regulatory response to the crisis of 2007-08 has been sweeping and important changes
in global bank regulation will become effective over the next few years. Most notably, a
set of new macroprudential policies will both strengthen regulatory constraints on bank
leverage and balance sheets and also make such regulation more responsive to cyclical de-
velopments. The most prominent example of the latter is the countercyclical bank capital
buffer introduced as part of the Basel III banking reforms. These upcoming regulatory
changes have motivated a set of important questions for policy makers worldwide: To what
extent should bank leverage regulation be countercyclical– tightened during upswings in
financing activity and eased during periods of banking system stress? How will the new
bank leverage regulation interact with the conduct of monetary policy?
This paper develops a macroeconomic framework with banking and bank capital that
can provide a quantitative assessment of these questions. To do so, we extend the model
of Meh and Moran (2010), which itself builds on the double moral hazard problem of
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), on several dimensions. First, we allow banks to choose the
intensity with which they undertake costly monitoring of their borrowers. As a conse-
quence, the extent of risk-taking by a bank becomes endogenous and can depend on the
economic cycle. Second, we introduce regulatory bank capital requirements. When faced
with higher capital requirements, banks will tend to increase their monitoring intensity
which may reduce risk-taking. Third, we allow lending decisions by banks to affect the
riskiness of the banking sector. We can then examine the extent to which macropru-
dential policy in the form of countercyclical capital requirements can mitigate the effects
of this externality. Regarding the non-financial side of the model, it is the same as in
Meh and Moran (2010) and is a New Keynesian environment in the spirit of Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Taken together, all these features allow the
study of the interaction between optimal monetary policy and countercyclical bank capital
requirements.
Our simulations reveal that the effects of bank leverage regulation differ markedly
depending on whether it is constant or time-varying. In response to a technology shock and
a shock to bank capital, countercyclical capital regulation dampens real macroeconomic
variables, bank lending, and a measure of banking sector default probability relative to
the time-invariant regulation. In the case of a negative shock to bank capital, allowing
higher bank leverage reduces the impact of the shock on inflation because it partly offsets
the drop in demand for final goods. In the case of a technology shock, countercyclical
leverage regulation dampens aggregate demand at a time when the productive capacity
of the economy has increased. This puts downward pressure on inflation, requiring the
monetary authorities to lower interest rates further.
A key finding is that strongly countercyclical regulatory policy improves welfare relative
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to time-invariant regulation when the economy faces shocks originating in the banking
sector. However, the optimal degree of countercyclicality in banking regulation will vary for
other, more standard, shocks to the macroeconomy. We show that, when the economy faces
productivity shocks, the welfare gain from applying counter-cyclical capital regulation
depends importantly on the aggressiveness of the monetary authority in responding to
inflation and the size of the banking sector risk externality created by rising bank lending.
This suggests that the appropriate contribution of regulatory policy to the stabilization
of more standard macro shocks will depend on the authorities’ assessment of the likely
impact of these shocks on the emergence of financial vulnerabilities.
This paper is related to several recent papers in the literature on banking and macroe-
conomics. Our model of banking and bank capital is closely related to Gertler and Karadi
(2011), in the sense that bank capital is motivated by financial frictions between bankers
and their creditors. In their model however, the financial friction is in the form of lim-
ited commitment, while in ours it originates from asymmetric information. Moreover, our
analysis focuses on bank capital requirements whereas Gertler and Karadi (2011) study
unconventional monetary policy actions. Further, our modeling of endogenous banking
sector risk resembles similar mechanisms in Woodford (2011a,b) and Gertler et al. (2011),
in which a link exists between lending decisions and the banking sector’s riskiness that are
not internalized by individual banks. However, these authors address different questions:
Gertler et al. (2011)’s model is real and thus cannot consider the interactions that arise
between macroprudential and monetary policies; Woodford (2011a) emphasizes inflation
targeting policy and Woodford (2011b) studies an alternative form of macroprudential
policy to the one considered here, where time-varying reserve requirements help stabilize
funding risks faced by financial intermediaries. Recent papers by Angeloni and Faia (2010)
and Angelini et al. (2011) share our emphasis on the interaction between monetary and
macroprudential policies, but these papers do not incorporate an externality in banking
sector risk, which can motivate the presence of counter-cyclical capital requirements.1
Other related work on bank capital regulation includes Van den Heuvel (2008) and Co-
vas and Fujita (2010) who assess the impact of capital regulation in models of liquidity
provision by banks but abstract from monetary policy’s stabilization properties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
Section 3 discusses the model’s calibration. Section 4 presents our findings on the quan-
titative implications of bank leverage regulation for the economy’s dynamic adjustment
to various shocks. Section 5 studies the welfare properties of regulation, with particular
emphasis on the interaction that exists between regulation and monetary policy. Section
6 provides some concluding comments.
1Dib (2010) also presents an analysis of bank capital regulation and monetary policy, but does not
assess counter-cyclical capital requirements.
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2 The Model
This section describes the structure of the model and the optimization problem of the
economy’s agents. The description is organized in blocks that reflect the three key ingre-
dients of our analysis: a financial environment that reserves a significant role for bank
capital and bank capital regulation in the transmission of shocks, an endogenous link be-
tween the banking sector’s leverage and its risk of distress, which provides motivation for
macroprudential policies like counter-cyclical bank capital requirements, and finally the
New Keynesian models in Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), which
allow a quantitative assessment of alternative macroprudential rules and their interaction
with the stabilization properties of monetary policy rules.
2.1 The financial environment
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Meh and Moran (2010), the financial envi-
ronment is centered around the relationship between three classes of agents: households,
entrepreneurs, and bankers, with population masses ηh, ηe and ηb = 1− ηh − ηe, respec-
tively. Entrepreneurs have the technology to produce capital goods but require external
funds. Households provide these funds via the intermediation of banks, who alone can
monitor entrepreneurs.
Two sources of moral hazard are present. The first one arises because entrepreneurs
can influence their technology’s probability of success and may choose projects with a low
probability of success, to enjoy private benefits. Banks can monitor and mitigate this
moral hazard problem, with more intense monitoring lessening moral hazard problem.
Since the bank’s monitoring technology is imperfect, some moral hazard always remains
and as a complement to monitoring, banks require that entrepreneurs invest their own net
worth in the projects they undertake. The second moral hazard problem arises because
bank monitoring is private and costly. As a result, banks might be tempted to monitor
entrepreneurs less than agreed to economize on costs, knowing that any resulting risk in
their loan portfolio would be mostly borne by the households providing the bulk of their
loanable funds. To mitigate the impact of this second source of moral hazard, banks are
compelled to invest their own net worth (their capital) in entrepreneurs’ projects.
We depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Meh and Moran (2010) by intro-
ducing an authority that regulates bank leverage, the ratio of the size of banks’ balance
sheets to their capital, and modifying the structure of the financial contract between the
three agents to take this regulation into account. We consider two regulatory scenarios:
Time-invariant regulation, with a constant regulatory leverage ratio, and counter-cyclical
requirements, which direct banks to decrease their leverage in times when credit is accel-
erating and allows them to increase it when credit weakens.
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Overall, the double moral hazard framework present in our paper implies that through
the business cycle, the dynamics of bank capital affects how much banks can lend and
the dynamics of entrepreneurial net worth affects how much entrepreneurs can borrow. In
addition, and in contrast with the earlier contributions of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
Meh and Moran (2010), the banks’ monitoring intensity and the actions of the regulatory
authority impact the strength of these two channels. The next subsections describe in
detail the conditions under which production of the capital good is organized, how the
financial contract that links the three type of agents is set, and the impact of the regulatory
authority on that contract.
2.1.1 Capital good production
Entrepreneur have access to a technology that produces capital goods. The technology is
subject to idiosyncratic shocks: an investment of it units of final goods returns Rit (R > 1)
units of capital if the project succeeds, and zero units if it fails. The project scale it is
variable and determined by the financial contract linking the entrepreneur and the bank.
Returns from entrepreneurial projects are publicly observable.
The first moral hazard problem is formalized by assuming that entrepreneurs can
choose from two classes of projects. First, the no private benefit project involves a high
probability of success (denoted α) and zero private benefits. Second, there exists a contin-
uum of projects with private benefits. Projects from this class all have a common, lower
probability of success α−∆α, but differ in the amount of private benefits they deliver to
the entrepreneurs. The private benefit probabilities are denoted by b it, where it is the
size of an entrepreneur’s project and b ∈ [B, B]. Among those, an entrepreneur will thus
prefer the project with the highest private benefit b possible, since they all produce the
same low probability of success.2
Bank monitoring can reduce the private benefits associated with projects, ie. limit
the ability of entrepreneurs to divert resources.3 A bank monitoring at intensity µt limits
the ability of an entrepreneur to divert resources to b(µt), where b(0) = B, b(∞) = B,
2Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that only the project with no private benefit is economically
productive, in that
qtαRit −R
d
t it > 0 > qt(α−∆α)Rit −R
d
t it +Bit,
where qt is the price of the capital goods produced by the entrepreneur’s technology and R
d
t is the oppor-
tunity costs of the funds engaged in projects. A sufficient condition for this to hold is that B ≤ ∆αR;
intuitively, even the biggest private benefit generated by the second class of projects has a smaller value
than the social cost it imposes in the form of a lower probability of success.
3In this framework, bank monitoring is interpreted as the inspection of cash flows and balance sheets,
or the verification that firms conform with loan covenants, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). This is
in contrast with the costly state verification (CSV) literature, where bank monitoring is associated with
bankruptcy-related activities.
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b′(·) < 0 and b′′(·) > 0. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between bank monitoring
and entrepreneurial private benefits: a higher monitoring intensity, akin to a tighter bank-
entrepreneur relationship, produces more information about the entrepreneur and thus
reduces his ability to divert resources. By contrast, a lower monitoring intensity – a more
“arms-lengths” relationship– generates less information and thus more severe moral hazard
on the entrepreneur side. Note, however, that bank monitoring remains imperfect: even
when monitored by his bank at intensity µt, an entrepreneur may still choose to run a
project with private benefit b(µt). A key component of the financial contract discussed
below ensures that the entrepreneur has the incentive to choose the no-private benefit
project instead.
Monitoring an entrepreneur operating at investment scale of it with intensity µt entails
a total resource cost equal to µtit. Since monitoring is not publicly observable, a second
moral hazard problem emerges in our environment, between banks and the investors pro-
viding banks with loanable funds. A bank that invests its own capital in entrepreneurial
projects mitigates the severity of this problem, because this bank now has a private in-
centive to monitor as agreed the borrowing entrepreneurs. This reassures investors and
allows the bank to attract more loanable funds.
Finally, we assume that the returns in the projects funded by each bank are perfectly
correlated. Correlated projects can arise because banks specialize (across sectors, regions
or debt instruments) to become efficient monitors. The assumption of perfect correlation
improves the model’s tractability, but could be relaxed at the cost of additional computa-
tional requirements.
2.1.2 The Financial contract
An entrepreneur with net worth nt undertaking a project of size it > nt needs external
financing (a bank loan) worth it−nt. The bank provides this funding with a mix of deposits
it collects from investors (dt) as well as its own net worth (capital) at. Considering the
costs of monitoring the project (µtit), the bank thus lends an amount at + dt − µtit.
We concentrate on equilibria where the financial contract leads all entrepreneurs to
undertake the project with no private benefits; as a result, α represents the probability
of success of all projects. We also assume the presence of inter-period anonymity, which
restricts the analysis to one-period contracts.
The financial contract is set in real terms and has the following structure. It determines
an investment size (it), contributions to the financing from the bank (at) and the bank’s
investors (dt), and how the project’s return is shared among the entrepreneur (R
e
t > 0),
the bank (Rbt > 0) and the investors (R
h
t > 0). The contract also specifies the intensity µt
at which banks agree to monitor, to which corresponds an ability to divert resources b(µt)
on the entrepreneur side. Limited liability ensures that no agent earns a negative return.
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The contract’s objective is to maximize the entrepreneur’s expected share of the return
qtαR
e
t it subject to a number of constraints. These constraints ensure that entrepreneurs
and bankers have the incentive to behave as agreed, that the funds contributed by the
banker and the household earn (market-determined) required rates of return, and that the
loan size respects the maximum leverage imposed by the regulatory authority.
Formally, the contract is represented by the following optimization problem:
max
{it,Ret ,R
b
t ,R
h
t ,at,dt,µt}
qtαR
e
t it, (1)
subject to
R = Ret +R
h
t +R
b
t ; (2)
qtαR
b
t it − µtit ≥ qt(α−∆α)R
b
t it; (3)
qtαR
e
t it ≥ qt(α−∆α)R
e
t it + qtb(µt)it; (4)
qtαR
b
t it ≥ (1 + r
a
t )at; (5)
qtαR
h
t it ≥ (1 + r
d
t )dt; (6)
at + dt − µtit ≥ it − nt. (7)
it − nt ≤ γ
g
t at. (8)
Equation (2) states that the shares promised to the three different agents must add
up to the total return. Equation (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint for bankers,
which must be satisfied in order for monitoring to occur at intensity µt, as agreed. It states
that the expected return to the banker, net of the monitoring costs, must be at least as high
as the expected return with no monitoring, a situation in which entrepreneurs would choose
a project with the lower probability of success. Equation (4) is the incentive compatibility
constraint of entrepreneurs: given that bankers monitor at intensity µt, entrepreneurs can
at most choose the project that gives them private benefits b(µt). The constraint then
ensures that they have an incentive to choose instead the project with no-private benefits
and high probability of success. Equations (5) and (6) are the participation constraints of
bankers and households, respectively. They state that these agents, when engaging their
bank capital at and deposits dt, are promised a return that covers the (market-determined)
required rates (rat and r
d
t , respectively). Equation (7) indicates that the loanable funds
available to a banker (its own capital and the deposits it attracted), net of the monitoring
costs, are sufficient to cover the loan given to the entrepreneur. Finally, (8) specifies that
the loan arranged by the bank cannot be bigger than a regulated leverage γgt > 1 over the
capital the bank engages into the loan.
Imposing that the incentive-compatibility constraints (3) and (4), as well as the budget
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constraint (2) hold with equality, we have
Ret =
b(µt)
∆α
; (9)
Rbt =
µt
qt∆α
; (10)
Rht = R−
b(µt)
∆α
−
µt
qt∆α
. (11)
Note from (9) and (10) that the shares allocated to the banker and the entrepreneur
are affected by the severity of the two moral hazard problems, themselves linked to bank
monitoring intensity. An increase in µt, say, reduces the per-unit project share R
e
t that
must be promised to entrepreneurs, because it reduces their ability to divert resources
(b(µt) decreases). However, this increase R
b
t , the per-unit share of project return that
must be allocated to bankers in order for them to find it profitable to monitor as inten-
sively as promised. Overall, (11) shows that the per-unit share of project return that can
be credibly promised to investors supplying loanable funds is linked to these two moral
hazard problems and dependent on the efficiency of the monitoring technology of banks,
as measured by the schedule b(µt).
Introducing (11) in the participation constraint of households (6) holding with equality
leads to the following:
dt =
qtα
1 + rdt
(
R−
b(µt)
∆α
−
µt
qt∆α
)
it. (12)
This expression states that the importance of investors’ deposits dt in financing a given-
size project is governed by two macroeconomic factors, the price of investment goods qt
and the cost of loanable funds rdt . Favorable conditions, when the price of capital goods qt
are high or financing costs for banks rdt are low, thus make it possible for banks to attract
more loanable funds and lend more. In addition, the overall extent of moral hazard in the
financial market, represented by b(µt) and µt, also affect the ability of banks to attract
loanable funds and lend.
Next, (5) and (10) together can be used to deliver
at =
αµt
(1 + rat )∆α
it, (13)
which states that banks promising to monitor more intensively (high µt) will be required
to invest more of their own capital in a given-size project, in order to limit moral hazard.
Said otherwise, in this model a greater capital participation of banks in a given-sized
project (more “skin in the game”) is associated with more intense monitoring, a key link
to understand the impact of regulatory capital requirements on the transmission of shocks.
Expression (13) also shows that an increase in the required rate of return on bank equity
8
rat (reflecting a worsening of the aggregate availability of bank capital for example) reduces
the capital participation of banks in given-size projects.
Next, assume that the regulation constraint (8) binds. Using (7), it becomes
at + dt − µtit = γ
g
t at. (14)
Using (12) and (13) to eliminate at and dt from this expression yields a relation between the
regulated leverage γgt and the monitoring intensity µt needed to achieve it while respecting
all incentive and participation constraints:
γgt = 1 +
(
qt(1 + r
a
t )
1 + rdt
)(
∆αR− b(µt)− µt/qt
µt
)
−
(1 + rat )∆α
α
. (15)
Expression (15) provides intuition about the way banks adjust their monitoring inten-
sity µt to comply with the regulatory requirements. The left-hand side of the expression is
the leverage imposed by the regulator, while the right-hand side shows how the monitoring
decisions of banks help achieve it. Consider first a bank monitoring at very low intensity,
with µt → 0. Moral hazard on the entrepreneurial side worsens but eventually reaches its
maximum extent B. Meanwhile, the very low monitoring intensity µt decreases the moral
hazard problem on the bank side considerably, reducing dramatically the bank capital that
must be engaged into lending. As a result, the ratio of outside funds to bank capital, dt/at
rises. In effect banks are lending very little, but investing even less of their own capital in
the projects, so that leverage is very high. As the intensity of bank monitoring increases,
moral hazard on the entrepreneurial side, captured by b(µt), decreases so that attracting
loanable funds becomes easier and the ability of banks to lend increases. However, moral
hazard on the bank side increases and outside investors now require that banks contribute
an increasing portion of each financed project with their own capital. As a consequence,
bank leverage decreases. The assumed properties on the schedule b(µt) ensure that a single
value of µt exists that achieves the regulated leverage. Figure 2 illustrates the situation
by graphing regulated and achieved leverage as a function of µt, as well as the resulting
choice for monitoring intensity.
2.1.3 The Regulatory Authority
As seen above, leverage regulation constrains the choices of banks by compelling them to
follow specific targets for the leverage of assets over capital they achieve. We operationalize
these requirements by assuming that regulated leverage γgt evolves according to
γgt = γ
g + ωxt, (16)
where γg is the steady-state leverage ratio allowed and xt represents an economic variable
that regulation might respond to (with ω measuring the strength of this response).
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The regulation rule (16) is specified at a general level to accommodate a series of
different scenarios about regulation. In this paper we analyze two such scenarios. First we
study Time-invariant regulation in which required leverage is constant regardless of any
economic outcome; this corresponds to setting ω = 0 for all economic variables. Second,
we also study counter-cyclical regulation that compels banks to lower their leverage in an
upswing and allows them to raise it in a downturn. We implement this rule by specifying
xt to be the ratio of bank credit to GDP, and setting ω < 0. This is consistent with
the evidence linking the pace of financial intermediation relative to economic activity to
banking sector risk (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009). It is also coherent
with the fact that under Basel III, all countries will be required to publish a credit-to-GDP
ratio as guidance for the operation of the countercyclical capital buffer. In practical terms,
such a counter-cyclical policy requires banks to accumulate extra capital buffers when the
economy is booming and allows them to draw down their capital levels as the economy
deteriorates.4
2.2 Endogenous riskiness of the banking sector
Because of the linear specification in the production function for capital goods, the private
benefits accruing to entrepreneurs, and the monitoring costs facing banks, the distributions
of bank capital across banks and of entrepreneurial net worth across entrepreneurs have no
effects on the investment and monitoring intensity decisions of banks in equilibrium. This
is an interesting feature of our model because tracking aggregate bank capital provides a
well-defined notion of the economy-wide lending capacity of the banking sector. This is
in line with the macroprudential approach of banking sector regulation that policymakers
are undertaking recently under Basel III. Another interesting feature of our model is that,
in equilibrium, the probability of default of the banking sector is given by 1 − α and
this measures the riskiness of the banking sector. In principal, the risk of banking sector
distress may be endogenous, depending on economic conditions and the behavior of banks
themselves.
A large and growing body of empirical work suggests that the banking system plays
a critical role in this endogeneous build-up of risk. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002) find that the strong pace of bank credit growth relative
to economic activity provides an important signal of impending banking crises. In addition,
periods of strongly rising credit and leverage are frequently associated with subsequent
recessions (Crowe et al., 2011). Furthermore, recessions tend to be more severe when bank
credit tightens sharply (Claessens et al., 2011). This evidence suggests that the risks to the
banking sector are rising in the upswing, a time when traditional measures of individual
4The analysis of macroprudential policies in Angelini et al. (2011) also features a prominent role for the
ratio of bank credit to GDP as indicator of banking sector risk.
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bank risk are low (Crockett, 2000).5
Modelling endogenous banking sector riskiness, especially in a macroeconomic envi-
ronment, is a complex task and is the subject of ongoing research. In our quantitative
exercise, we simply assume that the probability of banking sector stress depends on en-
dogenous aggregate variables. A similar approach has also been employed in Woodford
(2011a) and Gertler et al. (2011). Since each bank is atomistic it does not take into ac-
count its own impact on the riskiness of the banking sector when choosing its individual
leverage.6 We examine how accounting for a such a relationship between the probability
of default of the banking sector and aggregate endogenous variables would affect optimal
stabilization policies and the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies.
If one believes that a relationship of this type is important, as the data suggests, analysis
based on this simple approach may be more useful than one that ignores the endogenous
build-up of banking sector risk.
Specifically, to capture endogenous banking sector distress in the model presented here,
we assume that the probability of default of the banking sector increases as the banking
sector credit-to-GDP ratio rises above its trend—that is, the larger is this ratio, the higher
is the risk of banking sector distress (systemic risk). The endogenous probability of the
banking sector distress is given by the following functional form:
1− αt = (1− αss) +
(
It −Nt
Yt
−
Iss −Nss
Yss
)ς
(17)
where It is the aggregate investment at time t, Nt is the time-t aggregate entrepreneurial
net worth, It−Nt is the time-t aggregate bank credit, Yt is the time-t aggregate output. Iss,
Nss, and Yss are the corresponding steady state variables. The parameter ς captures the
strength of this endogenous link between aggregate leverage and the default probability of
the banking sector, or said otherwise, the strength of the externality imposed by individual
bank actions on the riskiness of the whole banking system. A potential interpretation
of ς is the degree of interconnectedness in the banking sector where higher a degree of
interconnectedness corresponds to a higher value of ς. The interconnectedness in the
financial system is seen by many observers as an important contributor to the severity of
5Theories of systemic externalities in financial systems provide a number of possible mechanisms that
generate bank behaviour in an upswing that raises the risk of greater banking system distress in the down-
turn (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009)). These include information contagion, where investors extrapolate
bad news reported by one bank to other similar banks, or the possibility that banks facing stress will engage
in asset fire sales that lower the value of assets held by other banks. Another example is that deleveraging
by banks through more restrictive lending will lower output and the prices of goods and assets. This can
increase the probability of default for all private firms worsening the state of bank balance sheets and
leading to further credit restrictions.
6Therefore, α is taken as a parameter when each bank solves its individual problem.
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the recent financial crisis. As we will see, this parameter will play an important role in
the quantitative analysis described below.
2.3 Non-Financial Side of the Model
Our financial environment with bank capital, bank capital requirements and endogenous
banking distress is now embedded in a version of the New Keynesian paradigm in the
spirit of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Accordingly, we assume
that final goods are assembled by competitive firms using intermediate goods as inputs,
intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms facing nominal
rigidities, households face nominal wage ridigities when maximizing their intertemporal
utility and, finally, monetary authorities conduct monetary policy using an interest rate-
targeting rule. The next subsections review these model characteristics.
2.3.1 Final good production
Competitive firms produce the final good by combining a continuum of intermediate goods
indexed by j ∈ (0, 1) using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
Yt =
(∫
1
0
y
ξp−1
ξp
jt dj
) ξp
ξp−1
, ξp > 1, (18)
with yjt the time-t input of intermediate good j and ξp the constant elasticity of substi-
tution between intermediate goods.
The following first-order condition for the choice of yjt obtains:
yjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−ξp
Yt, (19)
and expresses the demand for good j as a function of its relative price Pjt/Pt and of overall
production Yt. The usual zero-profit condition leads to the final-good price index Pt being
defined as
Pt =
(∫
1
0
P jt
1−ξpdj
) 1
1−ξp
. (20)
2.3.2 Intermediate good production
Intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities
in price setting. The firm producing good j operates the technology
yjt =
{
ztk
θk
jt h
θh
jt −Θ if ztk
θk
jt h
θh
jt ≥ Θ
0 otherwise
(21)
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where kjt and hjt are the amount of capital and labor services, respectively, used by firm
j at time t.7 The parameter Θ > 0 represents the fixed cost of production and zt is an
aggregate technology shock that follows the autoregressive process
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + εzt, (22)
where ρz ∈ (0, 1) and εzt is i.i.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation σz.
Minimizing production costs for a given demand leads to the following first-order con-
ditions for kjt and hjt:
rt = stztθkk
θk−1
jt h
θh
jt h
e
jt
θehbjt
θb
; (23)
wt = stztθhk
θk
jt h
θh−1
jt h
e
jt
θehbjt
θb ; (24)
In these conditions, rt represents the (real) rental rate of capital services, while wt repre-
sents the real household wage. Further, st is the Lagrange multiplier on the production
function (21) and represents marginal costs. Combining these conditions, one can show
that total production costs, net of fixed costs, are styjt.
The price-setting environment is as follows. Each period, a firm receives the signal to
reoptimize its price with probability 1− φp; with probability φp, the firm simply indexes
its price to steady-state inflation. After k periods with no reoptimizing, a firm’s price
would therefore be
Pjt+k = π
k−1 Pjt, (25)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 defines the aggregate (gross) rate of price inflation and π is its steady-
state value.
A reoptimizing firm chooses P˜jt in order to maximize expected profits until the next
reoptimizing signal is received. The profit maximizing problem is thus
max
P˜jt
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βφp)
kλt+k
[
Pjt+kyjt+k
Pt+k
− st+kyjt+k
]
, (26)
subject to (19) and (25).
The first-order condition for P˜jt leads to
P˜t = Pt−1
ξp
ξp − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφpπ
−ξp)kλt+kst+kYt+k
∏k
s=0 π
ξp
t+s
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφpπ
1−ξp)kλt+kYt+k
∏k
s=0 π
ξp−1
t+s
. (27)
7Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we also include labor services from entrepreneurs and bankers
in the production function so that these agents always have non-zero wealth to pledge in the financial
contract described above. The calibrated values of θe and θb are small enough to make the influence
of these labor services on the model’s dynamics negligible and thus the description abstracts from their
presence. See Meh and Moran (2010) for details.
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2.3.3 Households
Households consume, allocate money holdings between currency and bank deposits, supply
units of specialized labor, choose a capital utilization rate, and purchase capital goods.8
Lifetime expected utility of household i is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cht − γc
h
t−1, lit,M
c
t /Pt),
where cht is consumption in period t, γ measures the importance of habit formation in
consumption, lit is hours worked, and M
c
t /Pt denotes the real value of currency held.
9
The household begins period t with money holdingsMt and receives a lump-summoney
transfer Xt from the monetary authority. These monetary assets are allocated between
funds invested at a bank (deposits) Dt and currency held M
c
t so that Mt+Xt = Dt+M
c
t .
In making this decision, households weigh the tradeoff between the utility obtained from
holding currency and the return from bank deposits, the risk-free rate 1 + rdt .
10
As in Christiano et al. (2005), households also make a capital utilization decision. At
the start of period t, a representative household owns capital stock kht and can provide
capital services utk
h
t with ut the utilization rate. Rental income from capital is thus
rtutk
h
t , while utilization costs are υ(ut)k
h
t , with υ(.) a convex function whose calibration is
discussed below. Household i also receives labor earnings (Wit/Pt) lit, as well as dividends
Πt from firms producing intermediate goods.
Income from these sources is used to purchase consumption, new capital goods (priced
at qt), and money balances carried into the next period Mt+1, subject to the constraint
cht + qti
h
t +
Mt+1
Pt
= (1 + rdt )
Dt
Pt
+ rtutk
h
t − υ(ut)k
h
t +
Wit
Pt
lit +Πt +
M ct
Pt
, (28)
with the associated Lagrangian λt representing the marginal utility of income. The capital
stock evolves according to the standard accumulation equation:
kht+1 = (1− δ)k
h
t + i
h
t . (29)
8Households are indexed by i and distributed along the continuum ∈ (0, ηh).
9Note that the nominal wage rigidities described below imply that hours worked and labor earnings
are different across households. We abstract from this heterogeneity by referring to the results in Erceg
et al. (2000) who show, in a similar environment, that the existence of state-contingent securities makes
households homogenous with respect to consumption and saving decisions. We assume the existence of
these securities and our notation reflects their presence with consumption and asset holdings not contingent
on household type i.
10To be consistent with the presence of idiosyncratic risk at the bank level, we follow Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) and assume that households deposit money at a large mutual
fund, which in turn invests in a cross-section of banks and diversifies away bank-level risk.
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The first-order conditions associated with the choice of cht , M
c
t , ut, Mt+1, and k
h
t+1 are:
U1(·t)− βγEtU1(·t+1) = λt; (30)
U3(·t) = r
d
t λt; (31)
rt = υ
′(ut); (32)
λt = βEt
{
λt+1(1 + r
d
t+1) (Pt/Pt+1)
}
; (33)
λtqt = βEt {λt+1 [qt+1(1− δ) + rt+1ut+1 − υ(ut+1)]} , (34)
where Uj(·t) represents the derivative of the utility function with respect to its j
th argument
in period t.
Wage Setting
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005) and assume that household
i ∈ (0, ηh) supplies a specialized labor type lit, while competitive labor packers assemble
all types into one composite labour input using the technology
Ht ≡
(∫ ηh
0
l
ξw−1
ξw
it i
) ξw
ξw−1
, ξw > 1.
The demand for each labor type coming from the packers is thus
lit =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−ξw
Ht, (35)
whereWt is the aggregate wage (the price of one unit of composite labor input Ht). Labor
packers are competitive and make zero profits, which leads to the following economy-wide
aggregate wage:
Wt =
(∫ ηh
0
W it
1−ξw i
) 1
1−ξw
. (36)
Households set wages as follows. Each period, household i receives the signal to reop-
timize its nominal wage with probability 1− φw, while with probability φw the household
indexes its wage to steady-state inflation, so that Wi,t = π Wi,t−1. A reoptimizing worker
takes into account the evolution of its wage and the demand for its labor (35) during the ex-
pected period with no reoptimization. The resulting first-order condition for wage-setting
when reoptimizing (W˜it) yields
W˜t = Pt−1
ξw
ξw − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφwπ
−ξw)k(−U2(·t+k))Ht+kw
ξw
t+k
∏k
s=0 π
ξw
t+s
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφwπ
1−ξw)kλt+kHt+kw
ξw
t+k
∏k
s=0 π
ξw−1
t+s
,
15
where wt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real aggregate wage and −U2(·t) is the derivative of the util-
ity function with respect to hours worked and represents the marginal (utility) cost of
providing work effort lit. Once the household’s wage is set, actual hours worked lit are
determined by (35).
2.3.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy sets rdt , the short-term nominal interest rate, according to the following
rule:
rdt = (1− ρr)r
d + ρrr
d
t−1 + (1− ρr) [ρpi(πt − π) + ρyyˆt] + ǫ
mp
t , (37)
where rd is the steady-state rate, π is the monetary authority’s inflation target, yˆt repre-
sents output deviations from steady state, and ǫmpt is an i.i.d monetary policy shock with
standard deviation σmp.
2.3.5 Entrepreneurs and Bankers
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs ∈ (0, ηe) and bankers ∈ (0, ηb). Each
period, a fraction 1 − τ e of entrepreneurs and 1 − τ b of bankers exit the economy at the
end of the period’s activities.11 Exiting agents are replaced by new ones with zero assets.
Entrepreneurs and bankers solve similar optimization problems: in the first part of
each period, they accumulate net worth, which they invest in entrepreneurial projects
later in that period. Exiting agents consume accumulated wealth while surviving agents
save. These agents differ, however, with regards to their technological endowments: as
discussed above, entrepreneurs have access to the technology producing capital goods,
while bankers have the capacity to monitor entrepreneurs.
A typical entrepreneur starts period t with holdings ket in capital goods, which are
rented to intermediate-good producers. The corresponding rental income, combined with
the value of the undepreciated capital and the small wage received from intermediate-good
producers, constitute the net worth nt available to an entrepreneur:
nt = (rt + qt(1− δ)) k
e
t + w
e
t . (38)
Each entrepreneur then undertakes a capital-good producing project and invests all
available net worth nt in the project. An entrepreneur whose project is successful receives
earnings Ret it in capital goods and unsuccessful projects have zero return. As described
above, the entrepreneur’s earnings Ret it depend on the monitoring intensity of its bank. At
11This follows Bernanke et al. (1999). Because of financing constraints, entrepreneurs and bankers have
an incentive to delay consumption and accumulate net worth until they no longer need financial markets.
Assuming a constant probability of death reduces this accumulation process and ensures that a steady
state with operative financing constraints exists.
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the end of the period, entrepreneurs associated with successful projects but having received
the signal to exit the economy use their earnings to consume final goods. Successful and
surviving entrepreneurs save their entire earnings, which become their real asset holdings
at the beginning of the subsequent period. We thus have
ket+1 =
{
Ret it, if surviving and successful
0 , otherwise.
(39)
Saving entire earnings is an optimal choice for surviving entrepreneurs because of risk
neutrality and the high internal rate of return. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs neither consume
nor save.
A typical banker starts period t with holdings of kbt capital goods (retained earnings
from previous periods) that are offered as capital services to firms producing intermediate
goods. We assume that the value of these retained earnings, the net worth of the bank,
may be affected by an exogenous shock to its value, denoted κt. The presence of this shock
loosens the otherwise tight link between retained bank earnings at time t−1 and bank net
worth at time t, and is meant to represent episodes during which sudden deteriorations in
the balance sheets of banks, caused by loan losses and asset writedowns, suddenly reduce
bank equity and net worth.12 Inclusive of the valuation shock, a bank thus receives the
income at during the first part of the period
at = κt (rt + qt(1− δ)) k
b
t +w
b
t , (40)
which defines how much net worth can be pledged when financing entrepreneurs. The
valuation shock κt follows the AR(1) process
log κt = ρκ log κt−1 + ε
κ
t , (41)
where ρκ ∈ (0, 1) and ε
κ
t is i.i.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation σκ.
The bank then invests its own net worth at in the projects of entrepreneurs it finances,
in addition to the funds dt invested by outside investors depositing at the bank. A bank
associated with successful projects but having received the signal to exit the economy
consumes final goods, whereas successful and surviving banks retain all their earnings, so
that their real assets at the start of the subsequent period are
kbt+1 =
{
Rbt it, if surviving and successful
0 , otherwise.
(42)
Table 2 below illustrates the sequence of events. The value of aggregate shocks are
revealed at the beginning of the period. Intermediate goods are then produced, using
12Similar valuation shocks to the financial position of banking or entrepreneurial sectors are analyzed in
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), Christiano et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), among others.
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Table 1: Timing of Events
• The productivity (zt) and banking (ε
κ
t ) shocks are realized.
• Intermediate goods are produced, using capital and labor services; final goods are produced,
using intermediates.
• Households deposit savings in banks, who use these funds as well as their own net worth to
finance entrepreneur projects it.
• Entrepreneurs choose which project to undertake; bankers choose their intensity of monitoring.
• Successful projects return R it units of new capital, shared between the three agents according
to terms of financial contract. Failed projects return nothing.
• Exiting agents sell their capital for consumption goods, surviving agents buy this capital as part
of their consumption-savings decision.
• All markets close.
capital and labor, and then final goods are produced, using the intermediates. Next, the
production of capital goods occurs: households deposit funds in banks, who meet with
entrepreneurs to arrange financing. Once financed, entrepreneurs choose projects to un-
dertake and monitor at an intensity compatible with the double moral hazard problem de-
scribed above. Successful projects return new units of capital goods that are distributed to
households, banks and entrepreneurs according to the terms of the financial contract. Ex-
iting banks and entrepreneurs sell their share of capital good in exchange for consumption
and households and surviving banks and entrepreneurs make their consumption-savings
decisions.
2.4 Aggregation
As we discussed earlier, the distribution of net worth across entrepreneurs and bank capital
across banks has no effects on bank’s decisions about their monitoring intensity µt and
investment. We thus focus on the behavior of the aggregate levels of bank capital and
entrepreneurial net worth.
Aggregate investment It is given by the sum of individual projects it from (8):
It = γ
g
tAt +Nt, (43)
where At and Nt denote the aggregate levels of bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth,
respectively, and aggregate bank lending is represented by It −Nt. At and Nt are found
by summing (38) and (40) across all agents:
At = κt [rt + qt(1− δ)]K
b
t + η
bwbt ; (44)
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Nt = [rt + qt(1− δ)]K
e
t + η
ewet , (45)
whereKbt andK
e
t denote the aggregate wealth of banks and entrepreneurs at the beginning
of period t. Recalling that ηe and ηb represent the population masses of entrepreneurs and
banks, these are
Kbt = η
bkbt ; K
e
t = η
eket .
As described above, banks and entrepreneurs survive to the next period with proba-
bility τ b and τ e, respectively; surviving agents save all their wealth because of risk-neutral
preferences and the high return on internal funds. Aggregate wealth at the beginning-of-
period t+ 1 is thus
Kbt+1 = τ
bαRbtIt; (46)
Ket+1 = τ
eαRet It. (47)
Combining (43)-(47) yields the following laws of motion for At and Nt:
At+1 = κt+1 [rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)] τ
bαRbt (γ
g
tAt +Nt) + w
b
t+1η
b; (48)
Nt+1 = [rt+1 + qt+1(1− δ)] τ
eαRet (γ
g
tAt +Nt) + w
e
t+1η
e. (49)
Equation (48) illustrates the bank capital channel that is at play in the model: all
things equal, an increase in aggregate investment It increases earnings for the banking
sector, and through a retained earnings mechanism serves to increase bank capital and thus
further increases in lending and investment in the subsequent periods, which themselves
increase bank earnings and bank capital, etc. This mechanism helps to propagate the
effects of the initial shock several periods into the future. Further, one can see from
(48)-(49) that bank capital At, through its effect on aggregate investment, also affects the
evolution of net worth of entrepreneurs, in an interrelated manner where entrepreneurial
net worth Nt itself has an impact on future levels of bank capital.
Exiting banks and entrepreneurs consume the value of their available wealth. This
implies the following for aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs and banks:
Cbt = (1− τ
b)qtαR
b
tIt, (50)
Cet = (1− τ
e)qtαR
e
t It. (51)
Finally, aggregate household consumption and capital holdings are
Cht = η
hcht ; K
h
t = η
hkht , (52)
and the economy-wide equivalent to the participation constraint of banks (5) defines the
aggregate equilibrium return on bank net worth:
1 + rat =
qtαR
b
tIt
At
. (53)
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2.5 The competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for the economy consists of (i) decision rules for cht , i
h
t ,Wit, k
h
t+1,
ut, M
c
t , Dt, and Mt+1 that solve the maximization problem of the household, (ii) decision
rules for p˜jt as well as input demands kjt, and hjt that solve the profit maximization
problem of firms producing intermediate goods in (26), (iii) decision rules for it, R
e
t ,
Rbt , R
h
t , at and dt that solve the maximization problem associated with the financial
contract, (iv) saving and consumption decision rules for entrepreneurs and banks, and (v)
the following market-clearing conditions:
Kt = K
h
t +K
e
t +K
b
t ; (54)
utK
h
t +K
e
t +K
b
t ; =
∫
1
0
kjtdj; (55)
Ht =
∫
1
0
hjtdj; (56)
Yt = C
h
t + C
e
t + C
b
t + It + µtIt; (57)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + α
(
(It −Nt)/Yt
)
RIt; (58)
ηbdt = η
hDt
Pt
; (59)
M t = η
hMt. (60)
Equation (54) defines the total capital stock as the holdings of households, entrepreneurs
and banks. Next, (55) states that total capital services (which depend on the utilization
rate chosen by households) equals total demand by intermediate-good producers. Equa-
tion (56) requires that the total supply of the composite labor input produced according
to (35) equals total demand by intermediate-good producers. The aggregate resource con-
straint is in (57) and (58) is the law of motion for aggregate capital. Finally, (59) equates
the aggregate demand of deposits by banks to the supply of deposits by households, and
(60) requires the total supply of money M t to be equal to money holdings by households.
3 Calibration
This section describes our model calibration. The household sector of our model, as well
as its final good and intermediary good production sectors, are similar to those in leading
New Keynesian models such as those in Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). Accordingly, our calibration of those parameters is conventional.
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First, the utility function of households is specified as
U(cht − γc
h
t−1, li,t,M
c
t /Pt) = log(c
h
t − γc
h
t−1)− ψ
lhit
1+η
1 + η
+ ζlog(M ct /Pt).
The weight on leisure ψ is set in order that steady-state work effort by households be equal
to 0.3. One model period corresponds to a quarter, so the discount factor β is set at 0.99.
Following Christiano et al. (2005), the parameter governing habits, γ, is fixed at 0.65, ζ
is set to 0.0018 and η is set to 1. To parameterize households’ capital utilization decision,
we first require that u = 1 in the steady-state, and set υ(1) = 0. This makes steady state
computations independent of υ(.). Next, we set σu ≡ υ
′′(u)(u)/υ′(u) = 0.5 for u = 1.
Next, on the production side, the share of capital in the production function of
intermediate-good producers, θk, is set to the standard value of 0.36. Since we want
to reserve a small role in production for the hours worked by entrepreneurs and bankers,
we fix the share of the labor input θh to 0.6399 instead of 1− 0.36 = 0.64. The parameter
governing the extent of fixed costs, Θ, is chosen so that steady-state profits of the mo-
nopolists producing intermediate goods are zero. Following Meh and Moran (2010), the
persistence of the technology shock, ρz, and its standard deviation, σz, are set to 0.95 and
0.005, respectively, which are standard values in the literature. Finally, we set δ = 0.02.
Price and wage-setting parameters are set following results in Christiano et al. (2005).
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (ξp) and the elasticity of substi-
tution between labor types (ξw) are set to 6 and 21, which ensures that the steady-state
markups are 20% in the goods market and 5% in the labor market. The probability of
not reoptimizing for price setters (φp) is 0.60 while for wage setters (φw), it is 0.64.
Finally, in our benchmark specification, the monetary policy rule (37) is calibrated to
standard values, based on estimates such as those in Clarida et al. (2000): we thus have
ρpi = 1.5, ρr = 0.8 and ρy = 0.1. Our welfare analysis will assess whether this standard
rule can be improved. The target rate of inflation π is 1.005, or 2% on a net, annualized
basis.
The regulation policies we analyze in this version of the model are either a time-
invariant policy that sets the parameter ω = 0 in (16), or a counter-cyclical policy which
sets ω = −5, so that regulators limit the growth of bank credit in good times. Setting the
parameter ω = −5.0 leads to volatility in the regulated capital-asset ratios of banks that
are in line with the recently adopted provisions of the Basel III accord, which specify that
the counter-cyclical capital buffers will have a range of 2.5 percentage points.
The remaining parameters are related to the banking and entrepreneurial sector. To
guide us in calibrating them, we appeal when possible to the related literature emphasizing
models of financial frictions and also use targets for some of the steady-state properties of
the model.
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Table 2: Baseline Parameter Calibration
Household Preferences and Wage Setting
γ ζ ψ η β ξw φw
0.65 0.0018 9.05 1.0 0.99 21 0.64
Final Good Production
θk θh ρz ξp φp
0.36 0.6399 0.95 6 0.6
Capital Good Production and Financing
B B α R τe τb ∆α χ εb
0 0.1575 0.99 1.05 0.7 0.9 0.35 15.0 10.0
The production parameters in the entrepreneurial sector are α and R. We set α to
0.99, so that the (quarterly) failure rate of entrepreneurs is 1%, as in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997), and R = 1.05, so that the steady-state (relative) price of capital is within
a reasonable range. Next, the parameters ∆α, τ e and τ b are related to the extent of the
moral hazard problem in financial markets and the scarcity of net worth. The parameter τ b
controls the rate of return on bank capital (bank equity) and is set to 0.9. The remaining
parameters are ∆α = 0.35 and τ e = 0.7.
The schedule linking bank monitoring intensity µt and moral hazard on the entrepreneurial
size b(µt) is specified as follows:
b(µt) = B (1 + χµt)
−εb ,
where we set B = 0.9∆αR, χ = 15, and εb = 10. B, the maximum private benefits from
shirking, is set below the gain in return from choosing good project. χ was chosen to match
equilibrium monitoring costs to average bank operating costs in the data. Operating costs
calculated using Bank Holding Company Data available from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago are in the range of 3 to 5 per cent of assets. εb is linked to shirking and the
premium paid by entrepreneers. εb = 10 results in a premium of 300 basis points over the
deposit rate. Business loan interest rate spreads of this magnitude are reported in Gerali
et al (2010) and Angeloni and Faia (2010).
Finally, the link between aggregate bank lending and the endogenous riskiness of the
banking sector, the parameter ς in (17), is set to 0.1. This value implies that the probability
of failure increases by 0.2% after a standard macroeconomic shock like the disturbance to
technology analyzed in Figure 3 below. This sensitivity is intended to be a conservative
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value. Picking a value for this parameter is challenging, since it governs the response of
unobserved endogenous risk to the banking system that is rising when traditional measured
default probabilities (e.g. based on asset price returns and volatility) are low. Our welfare
analysis will study the sensitivity of our results to the value of this parameter, Table 2
summarizes the numerical values of the model parameters.
4 Business Cycle Implications of Countercyclical Bank Cap-
ital Regulation
This section analyzes the business-cycle implications of bank capital regulation, by study-
ing the dynamic response of the economy to various shocks, with and without counter-
cyclical regulation. It shows that this type of macroprudential policy can help stabilize
economic fluctuations, but that they also have implications for the dynamics of prices and
inflation.
Technology shocks
Figure 3 presents the effects of a one-standard deviation, positive technology shock on
two economies. The first economy features the Time-invariant Regulation (i.e. ω = 0)
environment and its responses to the shock are in solid lines. The second economy is one
where leverage regulation is counter-cyclical (ω = −5) and its responses to the shock are
displayed in dashed lines. Figure 3 shows that the macroeconomic impact of the technology
shock is markedly different in the two economies: while output and investment increase
briskly under the Time-invariant solution, they experience more subdued fluctuations
under a policy of counter-cyclical bank capital requirements. However, the reaction of
the price of investment goods qt, as well as those of inflation and interest rates, are more
volatile under the counter-cyclical regulatory solution.
These contrasting responses of quantities and prices across the two types of regulation
arise as follows. In both economies, the favorable technology shock raises the expected
return from physical capital in future periods. A positive shift in the demand for capital
goods puts upwards pressure on qt, the relative price of these goods. The upward pressure
on qt has the important effect of mitigating moral hazard in financial markets. To see this,
recall expression (12) arising from the financial contract. Expressed with economy-wide
variables, it reads:
Dt =
qtα
1 + rdt
Rht It =
qtα
1 + rdt
(
R−
b(µt)
∆α
−
zµt
qt∆α
)
It. (61)
As discussed above, this expression states that the reliance on outside funds Dt in the fi-
nancing of a given-size investment project is limited by the double moral hazard problem:
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banks need to credibly promise a sufficient return to outside investors. But the technol-
ogy shock has created upward pressure on qt, which attenuates moral hazard, because it
increases the value of Rht , the share of project return set aside for outside investors. It is
now easier for banks to attract loanable funds and, absent regulation, banks would take
advantage of the easier access to funds to increase their leverage with no commensurate
increase in their monitoring and screening intensity, possibly leading to the development
of serious financial imbalances, represented here by sharp increases in the riskiness of the
banking sector (probability of default).
Banking sector regulation, aimed at limiting the development of these financial imbal-
ances, now intervenes to play a key role in banks’ choices of leverage and monitoring. First,
under the time-invariant solution (solid lines) banks must keep their leverage unchanged
even with the favourable financing conditions, which results in a noticeable increase in
bank monitoring intensity. Under the counter-cyclical capital requirements environment
(dashed lines) the impact on the banking sector is more pronounced, because complying
with the regulation implies that leverage must fall on impact and remain low through-
out the episode. In effect, counter-cyclical capital regulation leads banks to accumulate
buffers of bank capital following the favourable shock which they would then be able to
draw down if bad times materialize later. The policy leads banks to increase considerably
their capital involvement in a given-sized project relative to what would occur under time-
invariant regulation. This higher capital involvement is accompanied by an important and
sustained increase in the monitoring efforts of banks.
Figure 3 shows that this counter-cyclical capital requirement succeeds in keeping the
development of financial imbalances in check: the sustained increase in the banks’ moni-
toring and screening intensity moderates significantly the increase in the riskiness of the
banking sector. But what impact does this policy have on aggregate economic activity
and inflation? To see this, recall first that since bank capital is comprised of retained
bank earnings from past periods, its ability to change immediately at the onset of a shock
is limited. In such circumstances, the banking sector’s only possible adjustment to the
counter-cyclical capital regulation, which requires more bank capital per unit of lending,
is to limit the response of bank lending itself to the shock. As a result, a much more sub-
dued response of bank lending obtains relative to the time-invariant solution, which also
limits the increase in aggregate investment. From that point on, the bank capital channel
described in Meh and Moran (2010) is responsible for the difference in the dynamic paths
across the two economies: the muted response of investment in the economy with counter-
cyclical capital requirements translates into smaller increases in bank earnings and thus
lower levels of bank capital in subsequent periods. The second-round positive effects on
bank lending and investment (with higher bank capital further facilitating the ability of
banks to attract loanable funds and fund projects) thus have a more muted impact.
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The counter-cyclical capital regulation also has implications for prices and interest
rates. By limiting the increase in bank lending and, as a result the production of new
capital goods, following the favourable supply shock, counter-cyclical regulation makes
the price of investment goods qt increase more than under time-invariant regulation. Fur-
ther the subdued expansion in general economic activity, at a time when the productive
capacity of the economy has improved, means that inflation will decrease more, requiring
the monetary authority to lower interest rates to a greater extent.
Overall therefore, favourable technology shocks are associated with easier access to out-
side loanable funds. However, counter-cyclical capital regulation limits the ability of banks
to tap these outside funds and instead requires them to increase their capital position in
lending. This leads to subdued fluctuations in real activity and limits the development
of financial imbalances, but it also implies higher volatility for inflation. These model re-
sponses suggest that policymakers face a tradeoff between mitigating financial imbalances
with counter-cyclical regulation and inflation performance. We explore this further when
we conduct a welfare analysis of monetary and regulatory regimes below.
Shocks to Bank Capital
We now consider the effects of shocks that lead to sudden declines in bank capital.
As described above, we study ‘valuation’ shocks which deteriorate the value of retained
earnings and cause sharp declines in the capital position of banks. Figure 4 depicts the
effects of such a negative shock to bank capital, contrasting the responses of the Time-
invariant Regulation economy (in solid lines) to the economy with Counter-cyclical capital
requirements (dashed lines). The size of the shock has been chosen to set the initial
decrease in bank capital at around 5%, a magnitude that is in line with recent evidence
on the likely effects of financial distress episodes.13
The decline in aggregate bank capital makes it more scarce. The efficient response to
such scarcity would be to economize on bank capital when arranging financing and thus
to increase leverage. However, this is not permitted under the Time-invariant economy,
as leverage must remain fixed throughout the episode. Figure 4 shows that as a result,
the time-invariant regulation economy experiences a deep downturn following the shock.
This results because banks are prevented from reducing their participation in the
financing of a given-size project (increasing their leverage) and must instead continue
investing their own capital in bank lending. This continued involvement is associated with
an important increase in monitoring intensity. Of course, without the ability to increase
leverage, and at a time when bank capital has suffered a significant decline at the aggregate
13Following other authors analyzing shocks to net worth of the entrepreneurial or banking sectors (Good-
friend and McCallum, 2007; Christiano et al., 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011) we assume bank capital
shocks have moderate to high serial correlation. We thus set the autocorrelation ρκ to 0.9.
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level, bank lending must go down importantly to adjust, and it does so in a pronounced
manner, declining by more than 4% on impact. In subsequent periods, the depressed
levels of investment lead to decreases in bank earnings and thus in bank capital. As a
consequence, bank lending and economic activity experience further decreases, through
the bank capital channel of propagation. The low levels of bank credit throughout the
episode lead to a sharp drop in the banking sector probability of default.
By contrast, in the economy with counter-cyclical capital regulation, the banking sector
is allowed to increase its leverage as a response to the shock, which enables banks to
alleviate somewhat the sudden scarcity of bank capital. As a result, the decrease in
bank lending is under 2%, much less than it was under time-invariant regulation, and the
economic downturn is not as pronounced. Counter-cyclical regulation therefore shields
the economy from the worst of the negative effects following bank capital shocks. Because
credit has not declined as much as under the time-invariant regulation, the decrease in
bank riskiness is correspondingly not as pronounced.
Notice further that because of the procyclical response of inflation following the shocks
to bank capital, there is no trade-off between stabilizing the riskiness of the banking sector,
the purview of macroprudential policies, and stabilizing inflation, as in the monetary pol-
icy’s mandate. Because inflation decreases following the shock, the response of monetary
policy is to lower rates. Such a monetary action is unlikely to lead to the development
of financial imbalances, as credit is already low. Likewise, the actions of the counter-
cyclical capital regulation, by shielding the economy from the worst effects of the decline
in economic activity, also help stabilize inflation.
Notice that under the buffer stock interpretation of bank regulation, the onset of this
shock to bank capital is an instance where the capital buffer is allowed to be drawn down.
As a result, the downturn in bank lending, investment and output are mitigated and infla-
tion is stabilized. The riskiness of bank failure, however, is allowed to be somewhat higher
than it would have been under time-invariant regulation (Hanson et al., 2011). Figure 4
helps to preview some of the welfare results we present in the next section. According to
the dynamic responses depicted in the figure, counter-cyclical requirements on bank capi-
tal allow the banking sector to efficiently react to the shock, in the context of the sudden
scarcity of aggregate bank capital. Relative to the time-invariant regulation environment,
both output and inflation volatilities are stabilized, with potentially important welfare
consequences which we study quantitatively below.
5 Welfare Analysis
The results presented above show that macroprudential policies like counter-cyclical bank
capital regulation can have stabilizing effects on economic activity and the risk of banking
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sector stress. However, such policies also affect prices and inflation and thus create a
connection between capital regulation and the conduct of monetary policy. Consequently,
correctly evaluating macroprudential rules requires a careful assessment of their impact on
both real activity and prices, as well as taking into account their interaction with monetary
policy.
To address these issues, this section presents a welfare analysis of the monetary and
regulation policy regimes. Specifically, we use our model to quantitatively evaluate alterna-
tive specifications of the monetary policy rule (37) and the regulation rule (16), measuring
the welfare performance of each policy combination with the unconditional expectation
of household utility it implies.14 To this end, a second-order approximate solution of the
model around the non-stochastic steady state is employed, in order to avoid well-known
problems with policy evaluation using first-order solutions (Kim and Kim, 2003). We
measure welfare over a range between 0 and −10 for ω (with increments of 0.25) and a
range between 1 and 3 for the values of ρpi, with increments of 0.1.
15
Our welfare analysis is designed to identify the optimal degree of countercyclicality
in bank capital regulation and to measure its contribution to welfare. We identify the
best regulation policy under different scenarios regarding the monetary policy rule, to
take into account its influence on the economic environment in which regulation policy
operates. In addition, we explore the welfare consequences of the monetary policy and
regulatory regimes by conditioning on the source of shocks, as well as assessing them when
all shocks are present. This allows us to explore the possibility that following certain types
of disturbances, the relative importance of each policy regime might differ according to
the type of disturbance that is affecting the economy.16
Table 3 presents our results. For each type of shock analyzed, the table displays the
policy mix considered in the first two columns. First, a benchmark for comparison is
established in case (i), by computing the welfare consequences of the calibrated specifica-
tion for the monetary policy rule (37) with time-invariant regulation, which sets ω = 0 in
(16). Next, keeping monetary policy unchanged at this calibrated specification, optimized
14Since entrepreneurs and bankers are risk neutral the alternative rule specifications we consider have no
impact on these agents’ average levels of consumption and thus the welfare rankings we obtain are robust to
including the utility of entrepreneur and bankers in the welfare computations (Faia and Monacelli, 2007).
15The range examined for ω is guided by the specifics of the counter-cyclical buffers envisioned in the
Basel III accord. These buffers will increase bank capital requirements by up to 2.5 percentage points.
A range between 0 and −10 for ω ensures that the fluctuations in the capital-asset ratio of banks al-
ways respect the Basel III specifications. The range examined for ρpi follows the spirit of Schmitt-Groh
and Uribe (2007), who argue that the monetary policy specifications evaluated should be implementable,
which requires policy parameters like ρpi to be within a reasonable numerical range as to allow efficient
communication of policy goals. They argue that a range between 1.0 and around 3.0 is appropriate.
16Our welfare analysis abstract from the presence of monetary policy shocks, to focus on the systematic
part of monetary policy represented in the rule (37).
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counter-cyclical regulation is identified by searching for the value of ω that maximizes
household welfare (case ii). The next policy combination analyzed has monetary policy
respond more aggressively to inflationary pressures, and regulation is again optimized,
to reflect this new economic environment (case iii). Continuing, case (iv) reports a sit-
uation where monetary and regulation policies are determined jointly, to maximize the
coordination of their effects. Finally, case (v) evaluates the impact on welfare when the
optimal degree of countercyclicality is implemented, but monetary policy reverts back to
its calibrated specification. In the following two columns of Table 3, the policy coefficients
that obtain are reported. Next, the welfare level achieved by the policy combination is
depicted and, finally, the welfare achieved by the policy relative to the one implied by the
benchmark with calibrated monetary policy and time-invariant regulation is reported.17
Table 3 shows that in all cases considered, a significant degree of countercyclicality
in bank capital regulation is beneficial. The table also reveals that the optimal degree
of countercyclicality depends in important ways both on the source of shocks and on the
conduct of monetary policy, which we discuss in turn.
First, Panel A studies an environment where technology shocks are the main source
of economic fluctuations. Case (ii) shows that optimal counter-cyclical regulation sets
ω = −3.0 when monetary policy follows the calibrated specification, which delivers a
welfare gain of 0.06% relative to the situation where time-invariant capital regulation
is present. Next, case (iii) shows that as monetary policy gets more aggressive in its
response to inflation, the optimal degree of countercyclicality in capital requirements also
increases, to reach ω = −9.75 when ρpi = 2.0 and up to ω = −10, when ρpi = 2.9, and
the welfare gain that these policy regimes generate reaches 0.3%. This result suggests
that the interaction between monetary policy and counter-cyclical capital regulation can
produce superior welfare outcomes when well coordinated. This interdependence between
the two policies occurs as follows. A positive shock to technology, say, initiates downward
pressures on inflation, which lead monetary authorities to decrease rates and thus stimulate
bank lending and credit. Absent counter-cyclical capital regulation, the resulting boom
in credit might lead financial imbalances to start developing, which would increase the
probability of bank failure, an unfavorable spillover from the monetary policy actions. By
contrast, the presence of the countercyclical capital buffers limits the formation of these
imbalances and keeps the riskiness of the banking sector in check, which allows monetary
policy to more efficiently stabilize the economy. In short, the presence of counter-cyclical
regulation facilitates the implementation of an effective monetary policy, by preventing the
build-up of financial imbalances following monetary policy actions. Conversely, case (v)
suggests that a successful policy of countercyclical capital buffers requires the appropriate
17The relative welfare gain is the percentage consumption increase that a household living in the economy
represented by the policy regime of case (i) would need to obtain a level of welfare equivalent to the one
enjoyed by a household living in the alternative policy regime considered.
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monetary policy to be fully efficient, since otherwise inflation might be destabilized: by
reacting too little to inflation when capital regulation is aggressive the welfare gain over
the benchmark is diminished. As presented here, this interaction between the conduct
of monetary policy and the effects of counter-cyclical capital requirements relies on the
assumption that increases in bank lending and credit are likely to contribute to the build
up of financial imbalances and increase the risk of bank failure. In a situation where
such build-ups are unlikely to accompany credit booms, we would expect this interaction
between monetary policy and capital regulation to be less active; we analyze this conjecture
below.
The second panel of Table 3 studies an environment where shocks to bank capital are
the primary source of economic fluctuations. As was the case in the environment with
technology shocks, significant degrees of countercyclicality in bank capital requirements
continue to be beneficial to the economy and provide important welfare gains. When
monetary policy follows the benchmark specification, the optimal value for ω is found to
be very high, at −10. Further, the welfare improvement that such a policy offers over
its time-invariant counterpart is 0.062%, a higher gain than the one that was achieved
in the corresponding experiment with technology shocks in Panel A. Shocks originating
from the banking sector thus make counter-cyclical capital regulation both more active
and more beneficial to the economy. In addition the interaction between monetary policy
and bank capital regulation is also modified, because of the procyclical impact of these
shocks on inflation. Recall that a negative shock to bank capital, say, will decrease output
and credit availability at the same time as it decreases inflation. Counter-cyclical regu-
lation on bank capital helps shield the economy from the worst extent of the shock by
allowing bank leverage to increase thus mitigating the decrease in credit. The response
of monetary policy to the same shock is to lower interest rates in order to stabilize the
falling rate of inflation and stimulate output, but this time without fears of fueling ex-
cessive credit growth and increasing bank riskiness, because the easing is occurring at a
time where credit is low. Using two different instruments, the actions of monetary policy
and counter-cyclical regulation thus reinforce each other. Because the two policies work
in the same direction, capital regulation may not need to be as active if monetary policy
increases its responsiveness, as cases (iii) and (iv) show: as the coefficient on inflation ρpi
increases from 1.5 to 2.0 and then 3.0, the optimal degree of countercyclicality remains
high but decreases slightly, to −9.75 (case iii) and −8.75 (case iv). Specifying a vigourous
degree of countercyclicality in bank capital regulation remains very important for welfare,
however, as illustrated in case (v): with the optimal value of ω in place, the welfare gain
achieved remains strong even if monetary policy reverts back to its benchmark specifica-
tion. This is in contrast with the situation in Panel A, where the welfare gain achieved
by the correct counter-cyclical policy was reduced somewhat when monetary policy was
29
not chosen optimally in tandem. This indicates that following shocks to bank capital,
the natural first line of defence to stabilize fluctuations is a correctly calibrated policy
of countercyclical bank capital requirements, with monetary policy playing a secondary
supporting role.
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 analyzes an environment where both types of shocks are
present. Interestingly, the optimal degree of countercyclicality in bank capital require-
ments remains high and its numerical value lies between those obtained in Panel A and
Panel B of the table. The welfare gain achieved by this policy over its time-invariant
counterpart is now 0.12%, a higher gain than under each type of shock alone, suggesting
that counter-cyclical bank capital requirements continue to be welfare improving. The
interactions between monetary and regulation policy suggest that the influence of broad-
based shocks, like the disturbances to technology, dominate the analysis and thus that
these two policies work well in tandem. For example, in Panel A of the table the optimal
value for ω increases as monetary policy’s responsiveness to inflation, ρpi, increases (cases
iii and iv) and this pattern is repeated in Panel C. Similarly to Panel B, however, Panel
C also shows the importance of correctly setting the degree of countercyclicality in bank
capital requirements.
5.1 The importance of an endogenous riskiness of the banking sector
The connections identified above between monetary policy and counter-cyclical bank reg-
ulation relied in large part on the endogenous riskiness of the banking sector, as specified
in (17). As this endogeneity becomes weaker, one would expect these interactions to be
modified. To analyze this conjecture, Table 4 reports the results of simulations that mirror
those conducted for Table 3, but in an environment with a significantly weaker endoge-
nous link between aggregate credit and the riskiness of the banking sector.18 Such an
experiment could be interpreted as reflecting an economy in which the shocks affecting
aggregate fluctuations are not expected to contribute importantly to the build-up of fi-
nancial imbalances and thus do not pose a strong threat to the riskiness of the banking
sector.
Table 4 reveals that some degree of countercyclicality in leverage regulation continues to
be beneficial for welfare. However, the weaker link between credit and financial imbalances
modifies the optimal degree of countercyclicality. In an environment with only technology
shocks, for example, the optimal coefficient for ω is now −0.75, rising in absolute value
to 1.5 as monetary policy increases its responsiveness to inflationary pressures. It is
still the case that by limiting the development of financial imbalances following interest
rate actions by monetary authorities, counter-cyclical leverage regulation allows a more
efficient, welfare-improving, stabilization of the economy; however, since their potential
18This is achieved by setting the parameter ς to 0.01 in (17), one tenth of its calibrated value.
30
impact on the riskiness of the banking sector are muted, the degree of countercyclicality
needed is much reduced and the welfare gain it delivers is much more modest.
Panel B of the table shows the welfare analysis for the environment with shocks only to
bank capital. Tuning down the endogeneity of the banking sector’s riskiness does not have
as much of an impact on the optimal degree of countercyclicality in this environment:
the optimal values for ω continue to be high, although slightly diminished from Table
5, and the welfare gain achieved by pursuing the correct policy is of the same order
of magnitude. This suggests that counter-cyclical capital regulation is ideally suited to
stabilize the economy following shocks to the banking sector, and that this statement
remains true whether the bank capital impairments are thought to develop into financial
imbalances or not. By contrast, the contribution of counter-cyclical capital requirements
in stabilizing the economy following the more standard shocks like the disturbances to
technology depends on the authorities’ assessment of the likely impact of these shocks on
the creation of financial imbalances.
6 Conclusion
Recent changes in global banking regulation have put counter-cyclical regulatory policy in
the toolkit of public authorities seeking to mitigate risks to the functioning of the financial
system. These changes have raised a new set of questions for policy makers worldwide
regarding the extent to which bank leverage regulation should be countercyclical and how
the new bank leverage regulation will interact with the conduct of monetary policy.
This paper presents a macroeconomic framework that can be used to study the impact
of different configurations of bank leverage regulation and how they might interact with
monetary policy. The model emphasizes the role of bank capital in mitigating moral
hazard between banks and theirs suppliers of loanable funds as in Meh and Moran (2010).
In addition, the lending decisions of individual banks affect the riskiness of the banking
sector, though banks do not internalize this impact. Leverage regulation mitigates the
impact of this externality by inducing banks to alter the intensity of their monitoring
efforts.
We find that countercyclical bank leverage regulation is likely to have beneficial sta-
bilization properties, particularly when shocks to bank capital are a significant source of
economic fluctuations. Further, we find that strong interactions between monetary policy
and bank regulation policy may exist. The stabilization benefits of countercyclical capital
requirements for a standard productivity shock depends on the policy response taken by
the monetary authority.
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Table 3. Welfare Analysis of Monetary and Regulation Regimes
Case Policy Mix Policy Coefficients Welfare Welfare Gain
Monetary Policy Regulation Policy ρpi ω Level Relative to case (i) (%)
Panel A: Technology Shocks
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6592 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -3 -1.6586 0.0596
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -9.75 -1.6567 0.2479
(iv) Optimized Optimized 2.9 -10 -1.6562 0.2993
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -10 -1.6586 0.0527
Panel B: Shocks to Bank Capital
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6551 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -10 -1.6545 0.0617
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -9.75 -1.6544 0.0631
(iv) Optimized Optimized 3 -8.25 -1.6544 0.0640
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -8.25 -1.6545 0.0615
Panel C: Both Types of Shocks
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6598 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -4.5 -1.6586 0.1169
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -9.75 -1.6567 0.3112
(iv) Optimized Optimized 2.9 -10 -1.6562 0.3633
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -10 -1.6587 0.1145
Note: Calibrated monetary policy sets ρpi = 1.5, ρr = 0.8 and ρy = 0.1.
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Table 4. Welfare Analysis of Monetary and Regulation Regimes
Low Endogeneity of Banking Sector’s Riskiness
Case Policy Mix Policy Coefficients Welfare Welfare Gain
Monetary Policy Regulation Policy ρpi ω Level Relative to case (i) (%)
Panel A: Technology Shocks
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6579 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -0.75 -1.6578 0.0046
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -1.5 -1.6562 0.1629
(iv) Optimized Optimized 2.7 -1.5 -1.6559 0.1921
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -1.5 -1.6579 -0.0005
Panel B: Shocks to Bank Capital
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6550 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -7.5 -1.6544 0.0588
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -6.25 -1.6544 0.0607
(iv) Optimized Optimized 3 -5.25 -1.6544 0.0631
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -5.25 -1.6544 0.0583
Panel C: Both Types of Shocks
(i) Calibrated Time-Invariant 1.5 0 -1.6584 0.0000
(ii) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -2 -1.6580 0.0451
(iii) Aggressive Optimized 2 -1.5 -1.6563 0.2127
(iv) Optimized Optimized 2.7 -1.5 -1.6560 0.2462
(v) Calibrated Optimized 1.5 -1.5 -1.6580 0.0431
Notes: Calibrated monetary policy sets ρpi = 1.5, ρr = 0.8 and ρy = 0.1.
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Figure 1. Bank Monitoring and Entrepreneurs’ Private Benefits
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Figure 2. Choice of monitoring intensity µt under the Regulation Solution
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Figure 3. Responses to a Positive Technology Shock
Time-invariant versus Counter-cyclical Regulation
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Figure 4. Responses to a Negative Shock to Bank Capital
Time-invariant Regulation versus Counter-cyclical Regulation
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